aisecurity.ninja

EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents

Nanxi Li, Yingzi Ma, Yulong Cao, Edward Suh, Bo Li, Dawn Song, Chaowei Xiao

Published Sep 5, 2026 ยท arXiv:2609.05903

cs.CR

EvoSafeHarness is a framework for automatically generating deployment-specific safety harnesses for frozen LLM agents, jointly evolving natural-language policies and executable enforcement logic to block prompt-injection and harmful-request attacks while preserving task utility. Its key idea is that agent safety should be optimized per model and domain rather than hand-designed once, and the reported results show large safety-utility gains across several benchmarks, though the evidence is still benchmark-centered and depends on the quality of domain specs, adversarial review, and the search process used to synthesize the harness.

Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are turning language into real-world effects, making safety necessary against both indirect prompt injections and direct harmful requests. System-level safety harnesses add an enforcement layer beyond model-level defenses, but existing harnesses are usually designed once by experts and applied across heterogeneous models and domains. Effective protection is deployment-dependent: models differ in how much enforcement they need before utility declines, while domains differ in the effects, state, and action sequences that must be governed. A harness that is strict enough for one model may over-block another, and a policy that transfers across domains may miss application-specific safety relations. We present EvoSafeHarness, a safety-specific optimization framework that synthesizes a deployable harness for a frozen model in a target domain. It jointly searches a natural-language policy and executable code logic, guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and fresh-context adversarial review to reject benchmark-specific rules. Across four agent benchmark families, EvoSafeHarness achieves a stronger safety-utility frontier than fixed expert-designed defenses. On DecodingTrust-Agent, it reduces average attack success rate from 45.6% to 10.0% at a 3.3-point utility cost and achieves the best score in 14 of 15 cells. On AgentDojo, it reaches 82.8% utility at 0.0% ASR, twice CaMeL's utility at the same operating point, and transfers unchanged to unseen AgentDyn suites. It also achieves the best score on Agent-SafetyBench for every victim and keeps mean ASR below 20% under adaptive PAIR attacks with a refinement budget of 16. Analysis shows that domain semantics determine which safety relations and trajectory state are needed, while model and runtime behavior determine how and where those relations should be enforced.